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sent? Do we have a right to ignore consent of the governed as an
(an, not the) ultimate value simply by labelling their decision as
morally obtuse or selfish or wrong?
Perhaps Little Rock is an example of a terribly embarrassing
but frequent event: that public discourse on moral issues does not
produce the moral result that liberal intellectuals know to be right.
The Supreme Court had initiated a public moral discourse in Brown
and as the public became more and more engaged in that discourse
in Little Rock and elsewhere, the public came to reject, not the
principle, but the priority initially assigned to it by the Court. In
short, Little Rock may be a perfect example of what the liberal
proceduralist wing of constitutional interpretation says it wants,
namely a public discourse initiated and guided by courts leading to
a choice of policies consonant with public values.11 The trouble is
that this particular discourse led to a choice of values and policies
that the liberals don't like. Thus it becomes necessary to characterize it as a discourse that went astray, that lost its focus on moral
questions and so reached a poor moral result. Those who are not
liberal may prefer to characterize Little Rock as a true moral discourse that brought to light conflict between the ultimate values of
consent and racial equality and yielded precisely that moral compromise which is to be expected and even applauded when two ultimate moral values collide.

THE BURDEN OF BROWN. By Raymond Wolters.1
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 1984. Pp.
346. $24.95.
Elaine W. Shoben 2
The Burden of Brown by Raymond Walters is a long book with
a very short message: integration is bad, but desegregation is not.
The distinction between the two is crucial to Wolters's analysis.
Desegregation is the prohibition of officially sanctioned separation
of the races. Integration, on the other hand, is the compelled mixing of the races for the sake of mixing. The "burden" of Brown v.
Board of Education,3 according to Wolters, is that the Supreme
II. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv.
L. REv. I (1979).
I.
2.
3.

Professor of History, University of Delaware.
Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
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Court has blurred this distinction and erroneously requires integration instead of merely prohibiting segregation. Wolters's thesis is
that Brown had two prongs: one said that officially sanctioned separation of the races offended the Constitution, the other that exclusion of blacks from the company of whites caused psychological
harm that also offended the Constitution. The fact that the
Supreme Court interlocked these concepts led to a common usage
of these terms as synonymous. It has also, Wolters says, led to tragically misdirected attempts to reform the nation's schools by integration orders. 4
Wolters seeks to support his thesis by tracing the effect of the
court orders in the jurisdictions that were part of the original Brown
companion lawsuits.s The narrative is painstakingly detailed, apparently thorough, and occasionally engaging. As history it is interesting, but it fails as proof that integration has harmed the nation's
schools. As a tool to assist legal decisionmakers in formulating
rights and remedies in the area of school desegregation, it is woefully inadequate. Wolters succeeds instead in telling a fascinating
tale of remedies law. His historical narrative inadvertently shows
that the road from Brown was determined by the need for a meaningful remedy for the constitutional right to the end of official
school segregation. Unintentionally he tells a tale relevant not only
to understanding the development of integration orders as an essential remedy to end official segregation, but also to an appreciation of
new issues in civil rights remedies.
I

Wolters appears to have no quarrel with the decision that segregation on the basis of race is unconstitutional. His disagreement
is with the remedy. Thus his book really should have the less
catchy title, The Burden of Brown IL Brown I was the original 1954
Supreme Court opinion holding that segregated schools violate the
equal protection guarantee. The question of appropriate relief was
reserved until the next term. The result was Brown II, in which the
Court articulated its famous command that segregated schools
should be dismantled with "all deliberate speed."6 The Court de4. R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN 7-8 (1984).
5. There were three companion cases in Brown I. They were: Briggs v. Elliott from
Clarendon County, South Carolina; Davis v. County School Board from Prince Edward
County, Virginia; and Gebhan v. Belton from New Castle County, Delaware. A fourth case
that became a companion case to Brown II was Bolling v. Sharpe from Washington, D.C. It
had to be decided separately on substantive grounds as a fifth amendment claim, but was
joined with the fourteenth amendment cases for the remedial decision.
6. 349 u.s. 294, 301 (1955).
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clined to follow the usual practice7 of ordering an immediate end to
an unconstitutional practice because of the anticipated difficulties in
the transition to desegregated schools. Thus the cases were remanded for an order to the school board in Topeka, Kansas, and to
the school boards in the four companion suits, to make "a prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance"s with the elimination
of segregated schools.
Wolters decided to trace developments in the districts that
were parties to the original Brown suit. In so doing, he chronicles
accounts of resistance and adaption that ultimately resulted in
schools that are as segregated today as they were in 1954. He concludes that these histories reveal the "burden" of Brown: black
school children are no better off in these districts today, while white
school children go to segregated academies at great expense to their
families.9
Wolters wants his book to make a social scientific statement
about the evil of judicial overreaching, 10 but his methodology does
not support his conclusions. The scope of his study is necessarily
narrow since only five school districts are examined. These five are
hardly representative, nor could they be called randomly selected,
precisely because they were carefully selected for test cases by black
activists in the 1950's. As social science, then, this book is not very
useful.
Despite Wolters's failure to do what he set out to do, the book
succeeds with a very different end. What Wolters has unwittingly
done is to chronicle a fascinating tale of remedies law. How does a
court enforce a constitutional right when the announcement of the
right is met with mass resistance? How do trial courts contend with
the task of making concrete orders to follow the nebulous command
of Brown II? The book thus succeeds unintentionally in revealing
the remedial logic of the evolution from desegregation orders to integration orders. Frustrated by ineffectual orders to end official segregation, courts naturally began to take a greater role in dictating
school boards' policies. When judges were reluctant to take that
step, those in government charged with enforcing the end of official
segregation cajoled them to do so. Aside from any desire that some
judges or social activists may have had to create racial mix for its
own sake,u racial mix orders ultimately became necessary to over7. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 63940 (2d ed. 1984).
8. 349 U.S. at 300.
9. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 284-85.
10. /d. at 275-76.
11. Wolters's account of integration in Washington, D.C., emphasizes the liberal tone
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come the resistance of school boards to meaningful open enrollment
plans.
This "accomplishment" of the book is ironic in light of
Wolters's conclusion that the book reveals the error of integration
orders as opposed to freedom of choice plans. Wolters's concluding
paragraph argues that desegregation rather than integration should
be accepted as the correct requirement of the equal protection
clause. He asserts that when freedom of choice again prevails, the
"[m]anagement of the public schools would then be returned to local school boards and superintendents, and racial policies would be
fashioned through the give-and-take of the democratic process."
Optimistically he continues, "With every form of racial discrimination prohibited, local officials would almost certainly improve on
the sorry record that disingenuous judges and naive educational reformers have made in the Brown school districts."I2
One must wonder when the conclusion was written in relation
to the work on the rest of the book. The narrative of the book,
discussed more fully in the next section of this review, shows instead that judicial reliance on the "democratic process" in school
boards to secure nonracial assignment was virtually futile. The
book thus underscores the familiar relationship between rights and
remedies: a right without an effective remedy is a paper tiger.
II

In the early years after Brown, the courts did what Wolters
advocates: they ordered school districts to cease official segregation. The question is what to do when a school board intentionally
violates such a decree. Wolters generously assumes obedience, but
his own account of mass resistance to the earliest desegregation orders calls into question his optimism.
Wolters's approach reflects little appreciation of the relationship of rights to remedies. The right that Brown represents is, at
least, a right to be free from officially sanctioned separation. When
a school district has been found to have intentionally separated the
of the opinions of Judge J. Skelly Wright. He finishes that chapter with the following
conclusions:
[Wright] was so committed to integration and so captivated by the sociological theories then expounded by James S. Coleman that he could not Jet pass the opportunity to impose his views on Washington's schools. Instead of assisting school
administrators in their efforts to upgrade public education in Washington, he identified them with the evil he was contending against, destroyed them, and in the name
of the Constitution delivered the school system to excesses of disorder and academic
experimentation.
/d. at 63.
12. /d. at 288-89.
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races in violation of this constitutional right, what remedy should
follow? Wolters does not say. Presumably the remedy would be an
order not to segregate anymore. But what if this order is
disobeyed?
Courts can and must do more than lament disobedience, of
course. Under a freedom of choice desegregation plan, a court can
require the school board to accept transfer applications from black
students seeking to enter white schools. When orders are disobeyed, courts have the contempt power, but contempt is more suitable to defiant individuals than to a body like a school board.13
Moreover, criminal contempt sanctions serve only to punish defiance; they do not secure the constitutional right. Damages could be
awarded to students who were forced to wait for approval of their
applications beyond a reasonable time.I4 But such remedies fall
short of addressing the right of nonracial assignment to schools.
How does one devise a court order that prohibits community harassment of black families seeking to send their children to the white
schools? How should a judge devise an order to prevent racial assignment of children entering school for the first time? These remedial problems for the very limited right of nonofficial segregation
suggest that an affirmative integration order is the logical solution
to force compliance on a recalcitrant school board.
The point is that an affirmative integration order is useful even
for the limited purpose of enforcing the end of official segregation.
Beyond that, there is the question of using integration orders as relief for children presently suffering the effects of past discriminatory
school assignment.Is Last, and very likely least important in the
history of integration orders, is the reference to the Kenneth Clark
13. The contempt power has failed in many contexts to be a simple solution for disobedience. Excellent reviews of the inherent difficulties with the contempt power can be found in
Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1975); Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183 (1971).
14. Monetary damages were not sought in any of the original Brown cases. In a 1973
class action in Topeka, Kansas, a monetary remedy was sought in addition to a petition for
an injunction to require integration. The district court denied the class action; eventually the
individual claim was settled. That suit sparked the reopening of the original Brown case,
however, because no final decree had been entered in the litigation that started twenty years
earlier. The result of the 1950's litigation had been the assignment of students to neighborhood schools. Plaintiff Linda Brown had been denied assignment to her neighborhood school
on the basis of race. After the litigation, however, those neighborhood schools were overwhelmingly attended by students of one race. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare [HEW] cited Topeka for violation of its guidelines in 1974, but the district court
ruled that it retained exclusive jurisdiction over the issue. New orders to close some schools
and to redistrict were made during the 1970's. Further Brown litigation was still pending in
1983. R. WoLTERS, supra note 4, at 263-71.
15. This aspect of civil rights injunctions has been very ably analyzed by Professor Fiss
in 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
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doll study in Brown I, which indicated that black children are psychologically harmed by segregated schools. This last reason, so
highlighted by Wolters, appears to be mere window-dressing.t61t is
hard to take seriously the notion that if the Supreme Court became
convinced that this theory of psychological harm is not scientifically
valid, then the Court would undo integration orders.l7 More likely,
integration orders would have developed to replace the freedom of
choice plans even if the Supreme Court had never mentioned the
Kenneth Clark study. Integration orders were natural and logical
because they were the only remedy that was capable of effectively
ending official segregation.
Everyone is familiar with the stories of mass resistance in
Prince Edward County, Virginia, and in Little Rock, Arkansas. In
Prince Edward County, angry whites closed down the public school
system entirely and sent their children to private academies.ts In
Little Rock, federal troops were called in to secure the peace when a
handful of black children tried to enter an all white school.t9 That
resistance was sparked by orders requiring mere desegregation, not
affirmative integration.
Less well known is the revealing story of a quiet little town that
was involved in one of the original Brown cases-Summerton,
South Carolina.2o Summerton was a town of 1500 people in Clarendon County, sixty-five miles from Charleston. It was a poor farming community with a high black population. Before Brown the
16. Professor Kurland's theory is that the footnote referring to Dr. Clark's study was
necessary in order to deal with P/essy v. Ferguson in some fashion other than overruling that
contrary precedent. Kurland suggests that Brown I was written in a "shabby, disingenuous"
way for the sake of achieving unanimity. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the
Beginning": The School Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Coun 1954-1979,
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 309, 317 (1979). Thus, with respect to Plessy, the Court wrote:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding [that segregated schools adversely affect black children psychologically]
is amply supported by modem authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding is rejected." 347 U.S. at 494-95. Kurland maintains that the footnote was only to
support the idea that psychology has advanced since the days of Plessy. His theory is that the
Court wished to achieve unanimity by handling Plessy delicately. Kurland then adds a comment: "It would take an extraordinarily sophisticated, or perhaps extraordinarily naive, approach to judicial behavior to believe that the cited literature [in the Clark footnote] was the
cause of the Court's judgment rather than the result of it." Kurland, supra, at 318.
17. An effort to relitigate the social scientific issue was rejected in litigation in Charleston, South Carolina, brought shortly after Brown. The district court accepted the evidence,
but ruled that stare decisis applied. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 147-48.
18. The history of Prince Edward County is included in Wolters's book because it was
one of the original Brown companion cases. /d. at 65-127.
19. Other constitutional issues involved in the fascinating tale of Little Rock are discussed in Farber, The Supreme Coun and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
20. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, 129-74.
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schools were what Wolters describes as "separate and unequat."21
The student-faculty ratio and the curriculum were much worse at
the black schools, and so were the facilities. The white schools were
built of brick and stucco, and they had indoor toilets and drinking
fountains. The black schools were made of wood, and they had
outhouses and buckets with dippers for drinking water. Moreover,
the white children could take buses to school, while the black children had to walk. The walk in this rural community could be for
miles, sometimes past a closer white school to get to a black school.
The Reverend J.A. DeLaine, who had himself walked ten miles
to get to and from school as a child, was the moving force in the
community. In response to an NAACP suggestion that the time
had come to challenge the white-only busing policy, he found the
families that were willing to be named as plaintiffs. The case of
Briggs v. Elliott was filed in 1949 and eventually became one of the
Brown companion cases.
Wolters tells us that before the litigation was over, the families
of the named plaintiffs suffered great economic hardship. The parents of Briggs, who headed the list of plaintiffs, both lost their jobs,
as did others. Credit was denied to others, so that they could not
acquire the supplies needed to farm. Wolters quotes an observer
who explained the squeeze this way, "[D]on't gin his cotton, don't
renew his bank note, fire him from his job. This is reprisal for anyone who wants to 'stir up trouble' and sign a petiti0n."22 An attorney in town explained that he would neither rent land nor extend
credit to any member of the NAACP because that organization was
trying to destroy everything the white people of Summerton believed in. "We would like, if they are not satisfied here, for them to
go where their ideas are accepted." Indeed, the Briggs family
moved to New York. DeLaine moved to a nearby town, but ultimately he went to New York. His church was burned; he was sued
successfully for slander by a white principal; he was told to get out
of town in ten days. This latter "request" was underscored by carloads of white men circling his neighborhood and firing gunshots
into the air. DeLaine sent his family to safety, then stayed for the
return of the angry caravan. He shot into the cars and killed a man.
He was given asylum in New York by his church and lived the rest
of his life in exile.
Briggs v. Elliott originally challenged only the whites-only busing policy in Summerton. It was later amended to challenge the
constitutionality of the racially separate schools, a theory the
21.
22.

/d. at 131.
/d. at 133.
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NAACP was supporting in several selected suits. When Briggs v.
Elliott came to trial, the NAACP-supported plaintiffs produced evidence concerning the psychological harm that segregated schools
does to black children. Among those testifying was Kenneth Clark,
who explained his doll study. The attorneys for the county did not
pay much attention to the psychological evidence because it seemed
so inconsequential. They focused instead upon the abundance of
legal precedent for the legality of segregation. The county conceded
early in the litigation that the separate schools were unequal, however, and noted that the state was in the process of massive revamping and modernizing of the black schools. The three-judge district
court ruled against the plaintiffs' theory that the equal protection
clause prohibited segregation, and retained jurisdiction to review
the periodic progress reports on the improved black schools.23
Briggs became one of the Brown companion cases. After
Brown II was decided in 1955, Briggs was remanded to the threejudge district court with instructions to desegregate the Summerton
public schools. Judge Parker then wrote the order interpreting
Brown to mean that Summerton must proceed with "all deliberate
speed" to operate its schools "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis." The order included a passage that came to be known as the
Briggs dictum that the Supreme Court had not said that the states
must mix persons of different races in the schools; it had only said
that " a state may not deny to any person on account of race the
right to attend any school that it maintains. "24
The whites in Summerton, outnumbered one to ten by the
black community, had no difficulty agreeing to resist the end of official segregation. A meeting of 350 white townspeople debated closing the public schools altogether. One local leader, a former
member of the General Assembly, successfully argued that the appropriate tactic was delay. He explained that there could be
twenty-five more years of "segregation time" in the South if methods of resistance were tested one at a time. The strategy was to try
a plan for the maintenance of segregation until the court prohibited
it. " 'When that is ruled out, another, then another, and another
. . . until one is found that is acceptable.' " Then, he explained,
closing the schools could be a last resort.2s
Summerton schools remained completely segregated until
1965-ten years after Briggs v. Elliott was decided in favor of the
plaintiffs. The delay was attributable in part to the decision of the
23.
24.
25.

/d. at 134-39.
132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (1955).
R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 141-42.
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NAACP to concentrate its efforts elsewhere. Thurgood Marshall,
an NAACP activist at the time, had witnessed the white mood
when he attended a meeting in Summerton in 1955.26 The NAACP
turned its attention to nearby Charleston instead. Meanwhile, the
Summerton activists had their own problems, as previously described. No black child entered a white school in Summerton for
ten years. "Unofficial" segregation successfully prevailed.
The suit in nearby Charleston succeeded in achieving token desegregation in 1964. A year later Summerton followed with token
enrollment of black children in white schools. That break finally
came with a new lawsuit filed in 1960 by fifteen black parents, some
of whom had been plaintiffs in the original suit. The district court
judge found that the Summerton school board had made no substantial effort to comply with Brown and that the schools were being
operated "in a discriminatory manner based exclusively upon the
race of the students."27 Applications for transfer had been routinely denied to all black students. The judge ordered Summerton
to admit the plaintiffs to the schools of their choice. By this time,
1965, only nine of the forty-three children who were plaintiffs were
still in school, and only five of those nine still wished to attend
white schools. Those five were enrolled.
Under Summerton's court-enforced freedom of choice plan after 1965, the schools retained their racial character. The black
schools remained all black. The white schools were attended by all
the white children and two percent of the black children. Because
the ratio of blacks to white was so high in the town, those two percent of black children comprised twelve percent of the students in
the white schools.
Wolters views this situation as nearly ideai.zs The white
schools were attended by more than a token number of blacks.
Those children were there at the affirmative request of their parents,
and thus they were more likely to adjust well. The harassment of
earlier years was virtually gone; some level of peaceful coexistence
reigned in the white schools with a black minority.
The problem is that this remedy fell short of enforcing the
26. /d. at 145.
27. /d. at 151.
28. Wolters appears in part to endorse the "optimal mix" theory of desegregation in his
conclusion. /d. at 273-89. He explains that theory earlier: "The theory of equal educational
opportunity held that the best situation for effective desegregation was one in which blacks
made up about 30 percent of the total number of students. In such an environment blacks
could escape the effects of being socialized in a lower-class black culture without suffering at
the same time from psychological isolation." /d. at 161. A major problem with this approach from a remedial perspective is how to choose which black children receive this remedy, if it is indeed an effective one, and which do not.
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right to the end of official segregation. Segregation was not over in
the sense that schools ceased to be identified as "white schools" and
"black schools." One could hardly consider official segregation to
be ended until schools lost the racial identities that the school board
had originally given them and still wanted them to have. Would the
school board have accepted all the black applications if there were
enough to threaten the white majority character of the "white"
school? Or would they have been rejected on the ground that there
was no room, without contemplating the possibility of a lottery for
accommodating overselection of a white school? How would they
have handled massive applications from black children at the entry
level into the white school? Unless a court could be convinced that
the school board would have responded to such circumstances without considering the race of each child and the racial character of
each school, it is impossible to say that official segregation has been
replaced by "color blindness."
In Summerton, official segregation finally ended in 1970. The
Office of Education brought the Health, Education and Welfare
[HEW] guidelines on compulsory integration to Summerton.29 The
Supreme Court had decided in the 1968 case, Green v. County
School Board ,Jo that affirmative integration orders could be an appropriate remedy. This remedy was then introduced in Summerton. The result was that all but six of Summerton's white
students withdrew from the public schools. They enrolled instead
in a Baptist parochial school that had been established in 1965, after
the very first blacks were admitted to white schools.J'
The white flight from Summerton's public schools was regrettable, but predictable from experience in other communities.
Wolters assails this result as resegregation that resulted in less racial
mixing than there had been under the freedom of choice plan.32
The resegregation was beyond the control of the court at that point
because parents cannot be compelled to send their children to public schools instead of private ones. But the final result did succeed
in ending any remnant of official segregation: the school board no
longer desired any individual school to have a particular racial
character. Schools were "just schools."JJ The fact that virtually all
29. Wolters notes at some length the irony that it was the Nixon administration that
vigorously enforced the liberal HEW guidelines. Richard Nixon's campaign against Hubert
Humphrey, Wolters notes, led the South to believe that Nixon was opposed to compulsory
racially-mixed integration. /d. at 161-65.
30. 391 u.s. 430 (1968).
31. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 165.
32. /d. at 173-74.
33. The Supreme Court used the phrase "just schools" in Green v. County School Bd.:
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the students were black is fundamentally irrelevant to the right to
end official segregation. It would be relevant only if the goal of the
courts had been to maximize racial mixing, a goal Wolters rejects.
The schools were now truly open. No other remedy could have
cured the constitutionally offensive intention of the school board to
preserve the racial character of the schools. Freedom of access only
"worked" because of the correct perception of the population that
certain schools were basically reserved to certain races; if any substantial number of blacks had taken advantage of the plan by applying to "white schools," white flight would surely have resulted.
White flight was unfortunate, but was an inevitable result of any
remedy that could have secured the right of blacks to truly open
schools.
III
The remedial problems in school desegregation cases are not
unlike those in employment discrimination cases. Consider the
problem posed by the case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,34 a 1977 Supreme Court case concerning
rights and remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Teamsters a trucking company was found to have discriminated
intentionally on the basis of race and national origin in the assignment of jobs. Minorities were virtually all assigned to the less desirable job of city drivers, whereas the better over-the-road jobs were
reserved for whites. The seniority lines were completely separate,
so workers could not transfer to the desirable over-the-road jobs
without losing accumulated seniority. Before the lawsuit, applications for transfers from minorities were automatically rejected. The
trial court found intentional discrimination and ordered that applications for transfer be considered without regard to race or national
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot be accepted as
a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a unitary system. In three years of
operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school and
although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in
1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the allNegro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system.
Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II
placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a
new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as
zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system
without a "white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.
391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (footnote omitted). It is this case that Wolters considers anathema because it changed the right from desegregation to integration. R WoLTERS, supra note
4, at 7, 274-75. Green is more properly seen as merely a remedies case, struggling to find a
way to enforce the previously announced right that schools may not be officially segregated.
34. 431 u.s. 324 (1977).
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ongm. The problem is that such a limited remedy alone is not sufficient for current employees, only for future ones. Current minority
employees could not take advantage of the right to transfer without
losing seniority. Only the few with the least seniority to lose would
be in a position to transfer.
The older minority employees who were discriminatorily denied the opportunity to transfer years ago are identifiable victims of
past discrimination. To leave them without a more meaningful
remedy would be a severe curtailment of the right not to suffer discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court said that such
identifiable victims could be granted retroactive seniority in the
over-the-road line.Js If this remedy had not been provided, the
over-the-road line would have been integrated by only a few young
minorities; the basic character of the existing work force would
have remained the same. The over-the-road drivers would have
been racially identifiable as a white group of employees, and the
older minority employees would still have been excluded.
The analogy to school desegregation is that the end of official
segregation is meaningless if the practical result is that schools keep
their racial identities. The identifiable victims of past discrimination are the black children who were discriminatorily assigned to
schools under official segregation. Most of their parents did not
choose to take advantage of the court-ordered remedy that transfer
to the white school was possible. Unless each of them actively preferred the school to which their children had originally been discriminatorily assigned, the remedy was incomplete; in the absence
of a constitutional violation, those students would have attended
different schools. The reason for failure to apply for a school transfer is unimportant. Although it was easy to identify seniority as the
reason for not transferring lines in Teamsters, it should not be necessary for the reason to be so easily identifiable. Fear of harassment
is certainly a possibility, but it should not be necessary to prove it.
Even if schools retain the racial character unconstitutionally imposed on them only because of inertia, their racial character is still
attributable to the previous constitutional violation. The question is
whether one believes that the identifiable victims have been put in
the position that they would have occupied absent discrimination.
If not, the remedy is incomplete. In such a case, the only way to
end the continued presence of intentionally segregated schools is to
order affirmative integration.
This analogy is apt only for the remedies necessary to undo the
continued desire of a school board to keep the racial character of
35.

/d. at 367-71.
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previously segregated schools. It relates only to identifiable victims
of immediately past discrimination. Once that problem has been
cured and schools have lost their intentional racial character, continued integration orders no longer relate to identifiable victims. At
that point integration orders would not be to remedy past intentional discrimination, but would be mixing for the sake of racial
mixture. Only then one can truly say that the right being enforced
is different than the simple right to the end of official segregation.
Another analogy to employment discrimination involves the
current debate about affirmative action remedies for unidentified
victims of discrimination. When an employer has been found to
have discriminated in hiring, a court may order as a temporary remedy that the excluded group be given preference in hiring. This
remedy is not limited to identified victims of discrimination, but extends also to unidentified ones. In other words, the people who benefit from the remedy are not necessarily the ones who suffered the
loss of the right. The Supreme Court has upheld this remedy in
some contexts,36 but is still considering its appropriate use. Most
notably, a case currently pending before the Court concerns the use
of this remedy in a consent decree by a state employer when there
has been no finding of past discrimination.37
In school desegregation cases, an order to integrate children
who have never been the victims of intentional discrimination
would be a remedy for those who have lost no right. The classic
example is the racial disparity between cities and suburbs. Theracial character of city and suburban schools usually is not the result
of the desire of a school board or a state to segregate. The economic
forces that caused such racial separation may be compatible with
the wishes of officials, but they are not intentionally caused by
them. 3s Wolters complains bitterly that this is a double standard
for the North and the South,39 but to grant a remedy in such situations would be to change the right. In fact, it would be to create the
very right that Wolters believes that equal protection clause does
36. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding
voluntary affirmative action plan by private employer as not violative of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964) with Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (reversing
district court order that modified seniority provisions of consent decree to provide for benefit
of unidentifiable victims of possible prior discrimination).
37. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that poses the questions left
open by Stotts and Weber: Can a public employer adopt a racial preference for unidentifiable
victims of possible past discrimination absent a finding of past intentional discrimination?
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 746 F.2d ll52 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2015
(1985).
38. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
39. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, 288.
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not contain: the right to racial mixing in the schools solely because
it causes harm to be separate for any reason.

IV
The nation's public schools have experienced considerable upheaval since Brown. Ending segregation has been painful. Many
believe that the public schools have deteriorated in the past thirty
years. There is a natural tendency to seek to fix blame for these
problems. Wolters speaks for those who blame the Supreme Court
for the upheaval and blame the deterioration on integration and liberal educational reformers.
The deterioration of schools, if it truly exists, is difficult to
trace. Many factors may be responsible. The fact that it is believed
to have followed Brown can hardly be conclusive proof that it was
caused by Brown. Wolters purports to trace the decline of specific
white schools to the influx of black students in the sixties and seventies. Those decades were also a period of enormous upheaval for
other reasons, most notably the Vietnam War and Watergate. Social science cannot by its nature be an exact science, but surely one
could do better by way of proof than this post hoc ergo propter hoc
argument. Why not compare schools, for example, where integration was beginning in a particular period with those where integration had not yet begun? Objective criteria could be established,
such as reduced test scores or the increase of graffiti on the walls, to
test the hypothesis that integration was the cause of such changes.
This proposed study is crude and fraught with difficulties, but it
contrasts with Wolters's willingness to attribute unquestioningly
such changes in the Brown communities to the courts. 40
40. Compare Wolters's ancedotal account of the decline of P.S. du Pont High School in
Wilmington, Delaware:
There were disciplinary problems, however, as racial mixing increased in the
wake of continuing white flight and black immigration. "It was almost as if there
was something magic-or hellish-when the black enrollment reached 40 percent,"
recalled Jeanette McDonnal, the dean of girls at P.S. du Pont High School. "The
black attitudes changed then, and the whites had reason to be frightened." Beginning in the early 1960s there were frequent reports of petty extortion at P.S. du Pont
as older black students demanded protection money from younger students of both
races. Graffiti appeared on the school's previously immaculate buildings, refuse
littered the grounds, and windows were smashed. More serious trouble erupted
after police picked up two black youths for questioning about some obscenities that
had been painted on a building. "They didn't pick up any honkies," one black
student declared, "so we were going to repay them. We were going to mess with
somebody on their side." Spotting a white boy and girl after school that day, a
group of blacks sprang to the attack. "There's some honkies. Let's go get them,"
the black cried. The white girl reported, "The girls came running across the street.
They kicked me, hit me, pulled my hair and broke my brassiere. About a dozen of
them. Some boys came over and started on my boy friend, who was trying to help
me. All I got was a black eye, a sti1f neck, and a sore head."
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Wolters blames the upheaval over schools on judicial and administrative activists who brought integration orders to replace
freedom of choice plans. Wolters believes that without such judicial
arrogance, school boards would improve upon the current condition of schools. As his own tales reveal, his conclusion is unsupported by the history of desegregation resistance. Orders to end
official segregation failed to provide an adequate remedy because
segregation continued to be the intention of the school boards.
Freedom of choice plans reflected only a concession that total segregation was no longer possible; the schools kept the racial characters
that the schools boards wanted them to have. Only integration orders could combat such unconstitutional intention to segregate.
The fact that in some places the result was resegregated education
because of white flight is unfortunate but irrelevant. Only when the
school boards ceased to govern schools that resembled the old officially segregated schools did official segregation end.
Other scholars have identified other possible reasons why
Brown caused upheaval in the schools. Professor Wilkinson blames
the Supreme Court for taking so long to end the slow deliberateness
of "all deliberate speed."4I Dean Bell blames parents for their racist
response to any mixing of the races in schools. 42 Wolters, as we
have seen, blames integration orders that replaced freedom of
choice plans.
Perhaps there is no blame to be fixed at all. It is possible that
public schools are the same as they would have been had they remained officially segregrated. Whatever the unknowable truth, it
seems unlikely that Brown remedies could have successfully developed any other way. Once one accepts that official segregation of
the races is offensive to the Constitution, enforcing that right becomes a remedial problem.
Wolters's desire to turn back the clock and allow freedom of
choice plans is understandable, but not helpful. First, the clock
cannot be turned back; it is naive to think that it could. Second,
even if we could redo history, it would be a mistake to freeze the
development of school desegregation remedies with freedom of
choice plans. To do so would be to countenance the intentional
perpetuation of the vestiges of official segregation. The right to the
end of official segregation would thus be left without an effective
remedy. Rights without effective remedies are no rights at all.
/d. at 191-92 (footnote references to two personal interviews omitted).
41. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A
History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978).
42. Bell, A School Desegregation Post-Mortem, 62 TEX. L. REv. 175 (1983).

